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ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES:
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND THE
CONSTITUTION©
BY EDWARD M. IACOBUCCI*
This article assesses the economic efficiency of race-
based antidiscrimination and affirmative action policies
with a view to assessing relevant Canadian and
American consitutional law. The article reviews
economic arguments about why antidiscrimination laws
may be efficient in addressing externalities, in hastening
the exit of bigoted employers from the market, and in
preventing the potentially inefficient use of race as a
proxy for information; affirmative action may be
efficient in accounting for differential signaling costs
across race. The article concludes that economic
analysis supports the approach in section 15 of the
Charter which generally bans discriminatory
government action, but recognizes that affirmative
action is not inconsistent with the pursuit of substantive
equality.
Cet article 6value l'efficacit6 6conomique de la
politique anti-discriminatoire bas6e sur la race et des
mesures en faveur des minorit6s, dans la perspective
d'une 6valuation du droit constitutionnel canadien et
am6ricain y ayant rapport. L'article expose les
arguments 6conomiques quant aux raisons pour
lesquelles les lois anti-discriminatoires pourraient atre
efficaces en abordant des probl6mes superficiels, en
acc616rant 'exclusion des employeurs bigots du march6,
et en emplchant l'usage potentiellement inefficace de
la race comme procuration pour avoir des
informations; les mesures en faveur des minoritds
pourraient 6tre efficaces en rendant compte des
indications de cofits diff6rentiels i travers la race.
L'article conclut que l'analyse 6conomique appuie
l'approche dans la section 15 de la Charte qui interdit
g6n6ralement au gouvernement toute action
discriminatoire, mais qui reconnait que les mesures en
faveur des minorit s ne sont pas incompatibles avec la
poursuite d'une 6quit6 substantive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will join the extensive debate about the desirability of
both antidiscrimination laws and affirmative action policies, with a view
to assessing the Canadian and American constitutions. Specifically, the
article will assess the economic efficiency of these laws with respect to
discrimination on the basis of race. The analysis is specific to race
because it will explore the effects of family background on a person's
costs of education. Family background and race are clearly related,
while family background may vary considerably across other features
that give rise to discrimination, such as sexual orientation.
Antidiscrimination laws are defined for the purposes of this article as
laws which generally prohibit the use of race as a negative factor in
hiring decisions. Affirmative action is defined for the purposes of this
article as hiring or accepting for academic placement a member of an
historically disadvantaged minority with lower formal qualifications (for
example, academic background) than a rejected member of a different
race.
While there are many approaches to the treatment of racial
discrimination, this article will focus only on an efficiency approach.
Antidiscrimination and Economic Efficiency
This is not the only or even the best approach to the topic,I but rather is
one that is frequently taken to criticize the existence of these laws2 This
perspective in part motivates the analysis here. The analysis
demonstrates that under plausible assumptions antidiscrimination laws,
and indeed affirmative action policies, may be efficient, contradicting the
claims of some of these policies' most vociferous critics.
The article will first consider the literature on the effects of
discrimination motivated by animus towards particular races. I will
review arguments that antidiscrimination laws may be efficient in
hastening the exit of bigoted employers from the managerial market.
The next section will present and critique an allegedly efficient basis for
racial homogeneity in the workplace. The following sections will assess
the use by employers of race as a proxy for more extensive information
about prospective employees. I will first outline the theory that such
discriminatory treatment is efficient, and then will review various
theories that suggest otherwise.
In order to provide an empirical frame of reference for the
information-based models, the article will generally focus on the case of
African-Americans. This context is appropriate for the discussion
because African-Americans have undeniably suffered disadvantage
historically because of their race. This historical disadvantage will be
shown to be relevant to an efficiency assessment of affirmative action.
While other groups may also be appropriate in this respect, for example,
Aboriginal Canadians, the intensity of the controversy over affirmative
action in the United States has given rise to extensive discussion of
African-Americans' historical disadvantage and their current situation.
Black Americans uncontroversially present a context involving historical
disadvantage because of race.
Rather than analyzing empirically a particular context and
assessing the efficiency of antidiscrimination or affirmative action laws in
that context, I will use the theory to assess relevant aspects of
constitutional law in Canada and the United States. The central issue is
what efficiency considerations suggest that governments should be
constitutionally allowed to do, which can be answered in the abstract,
rather than what they should actually do, which requires an empirical
assessment of a particular context beyond the scope of this article. The
1 For a brief survey of the various possible approaches to discrimination, see M.J. Trebilcock,
The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993) c. 9.
2 See, for example, R.A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1981) s. 4; and R.A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment
Discrimination Laws (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) c. 3.
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article concludes that the provisions of section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 is desirable from an efficiency
perspective.
II. DISCRIMINATION MOTIVATED BY ANIMUS
A. A StaticAnalysis
In a pioneering treatise on the economics of discrimination, Gary
Becker outlines the effect of bigotry on the market.4 If white employers,
for example, have a distaste for members of a particular race, for
example, Black people, then hiring a Black worker imposes a non-
pecuniary cost on that employer. The bigoted employer therefore may
abandon money-profit maximizing strategies in favour of a money-plus-
non-pecuniary income maximizing strategy. Consequently, demand for
Black workers is reduced, which in turn implies that fewer will be hired
and those that are employed will earn a lower wage than they would earn
in the absence of discrimination. Furthermore, even if the productivity
of Black and White workers is identical, white workers will earn more
than Black workers in equilibrium.
Note that this distaste may not diminish social welfare in the
conventional utilitarian sense. The distortion introduced by bigotry
causes a loss of money income for the economy (as Black labour will be
underutilized) but bigoted White employers do not incur the same non-
pecuniary costs of hiring Black workers that would result if they pursued
colourblind hiring policies5 The equilibrium allowing bigoted
employers to discriminate against Blacks may be utility maximizing for a
given set of societal preferences.
These conclusions have led some commentators to suggest that
any government intervention to reduce or eliminate bigotry in the
market is misguided. Any coercion by government requiring pursuit of
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
4 G.S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
Becker discusses a variety of types of marketplace discrimination, including consumer, employee,
and employer prejudice. This section discusses Becker's views on the effects of employer prejudice.
5 This assumption that employers may abandon money-profit maximizing goals if they are
bigoted is consistent with other observed instances where people sacrifice money income for non-
pecuniary benefits. For example, in a famous remark, J.R. Hicks suggests that "[t]he best of all
monopoly profits is a quiet life": "Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly"
(1935) 3 Econometrica 1 at 8.
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colourblind hiring practices will be socially undesirable as it will force
bigoted employers to incur non-pecuniary costs that a market
equilibrium avoids. As William Landes states: "[I]f the benefits [of
government intervention] are viewed as the added net (monetary plus
psyche) income to the community, then the benefits would be negative,
because net income is maximized in the absence of fair employment
laws." 6
This conclusion does not necessarily hold if the basic
assumptions behind the Becker model are modified, and perhaps made
more realistic. Consider now that an act of discrimination implies costs
that are not accounted for in Becker's model. For example, consider the
situation where there are externalities resulting from an act of bigotry.
7
If a White employer refusing to hire a Black person at the same wage as
a White person imposes a harm on other parties not privy to the
transaction, such as other people who abhor bigotry, then there is no
assurance that private exchange will result in welfare improvements. By
avoiding his own non-pecuniary cost of hiring a Black person, the
bigoted employer imposes costs on others that may be greater than the
cost he himself avoids. In this case, it may be efficient for the
government to intervene, as it does in other cases of externalities (such
as pollution), and prevent acts of bigotry that serve to reduce social
welfare. Externalities challenge the claim that intervention to prevent
employers or others from acting on their bigoted tastes is inherently
inefficient and therefore undesirable.
B. A Dynamic Analysis
The long-run effects of employer tastes for discrimination also
have important implications for government policy. Becker and others8
contend that a dynamic analysis of the market leads to the conclusion
that government intervention to prevent or reduce bigotry in the market
may be unnecessary even if otherwise desirable; competition itself may
ensure that discriminating employers are driven from the market.9
6 W.M. Landes, "The Economics of Fair Employment Laws" (1968) 76 J. Pol. Econ. 507 at
548.
7 See J.G. Macintosh, "Employment Discrimination: An Economic Perspective" (1987) 19
Ottawa L. Rev. 275 at 306-08; and J.J. Donohue III, "Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing
Employment Discrimination Law" (1992) 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1583 at 1586.
8 See, for example, Posner, supra note 2; and Epstein, supra note 2.
9 See Becker, supra note 4 at 39-49.
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Following Becker, assume now that there are some White employers
with a distaste for Black employees, while other employers are
indifferent with respect to race. The bigoted employers face some non-
pecuniary costs from hiring Black workers that the indifferent employers
avoid. There is scope, therefore, for the indifferent employers to
increase the value of a firm by purchasing the firm from the bigoted
employers; they earn the money return of the bigot without the psychic
costs resulting from hiring Black employees. Alternatively, bigoted
employers who do not sell their firms will eventually fail, owing to their
higher costs. Thus, over time bigoted employers are driven from the
market without government intervention.
John Donohue contends that government intervention to
prevent discrimination in the marketplace may be efficient, even
accepting the premises of the above analysis.10 If the government bans
all forms of discrimination in hiring, then bigoted employers are
prevented from reducing the non-pecuniary costs of employing Black
workers by hiring fewer of them. If bigoted employers are coerced into
hiring in a non-discriminatory fashion, they will earn lower returns
(psychic and money) than they would in an unregulated equilibrium.
This serves to speed up the adjustment process described above whereby
bigoted employers are driven from the market, since bigoted employers
will earn less in monetary and psychic income than they would absent
government intervention. By hastening the adjustment process, the new,
higher social-welfare equilibrium will be reached sooner, which results in
a welfare gain relative to the unregulated process. This must be
balanced against the lower social welfare that will result immediately
after this policy is put into place because of the imposition of non-
pecuniary costs on bigoted employers before they leave the market.
Donohue's analysis shows that on balance the imposition of government
regulation banning discrimination may be efficient. He concludes:
It is entirely plausible, although ultimately an empirical question, that Title VII [of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964111 can be understood to represent wealth-maximizing legislation
rather than as some tyrannical or misguided attempt to disregard private preferences.
Indeed, antidiscrimination legislation may be thought of as a tool to perfect the market
response to employer discrimination.12
10 See J.J. Donohue III, "Is Title VII Efficient?" (1986) 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1411 [hereinafter
"Efficient?"]; R. Posner, "The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII" (1987) 136 U. Pa. L. Rev,
513; and J.J. Donohue III, "Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply
to Judge Posner" (1987) 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 523 [hereinafter "A Reply"].
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000el - 17 (1996).
12 "Efficient?," supra note 10 at 1431.
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III. THE EFFICIENCY OF RACIAL HOMOGENEITY
IN THE WORKPLACE
Richard Epstein suggests that hiring along racial lines may be an
efficient means of promoting informal arrangements between employers
and employees.1 3 The basic argument runs as follows. The greater the
racial homogeneity within a group of people, the greater the likelihood
of homogeneous preferences. The greater the harmony in tastes and
preferences of employees, the lower the cost of corporate governance.
Therefore, racial homogeneity among employees reduces the cost of
corporate governance in an efficient way.
Epstein also contends that racial homogeneity helps enforce
informal contracts between employers and employees. In any market
where long-term relationships are established, with sunk costs on both
sides of the contract, there is an opportunity for one side to exploit the
sunk costs of the other side. In labour markets, for example, there is a
possibility that the worker will shirk in carrying out her duties knowing
that termination is costly for the employer. One method of remedying
this problem is to rely on informal sanctions to punish such behaviour.
Epstein contends that these informal sanctions are more effective if
workers and employers are of the same race:
[I]nformal enforcement becomes more effective when members of a firm are all drawn
from the same racial or ethnic group. The party who cheats at work now knows that he
faces stricter sanctions, given the strong likelihood that the information will be brought
home to him at play, at church, or in other business and social settings.
14
Epstein concludes that discrimination is thus in some contexts efficient
and that Donohue's analysis of the dynamic efficiency of
antidiscrimination laws is unconvincing. Indeed, Epstein states that,
"[i]n light of my arguments, his conclusion cannot be accepted."lS
While Epstein's analysis would likely strike many as distasteful, 16
it also contains questionable premises and conclusions. With respect to
the racial harmony and corporate governance argument, the minor
premise asserts that members of similar races are more likely to have
similar preferences in the workplace, yet Epstein provides no theoretical
13 Epstein, supra note 2, c. 3.
14 Ibid. at 70.
15 Ibid. at 77.
16 Michael Trebilcock points out that the argument "risks resurrecting a version of the
'separate but equal' doctrine adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson and now
almost universally discredited": supra note 1 at 200.
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or empirical basis for this assertion. Others might not accept this
premise as self-evident. Verkerke states: "I doubt the usefulness of
racial and ethnic affiliations as a proxy for job-related preferences of
workers. The potential for intra-group heterogeneity of preferences
seems to me every bit as great as the potential for disagreement between
members of different racial or ethnic groups." 17
With respect to the informal sanction argument, it is far from
self-evident that informal sanctions are significantly more effective if
workers are hired from only one particular race. Informal and formal
sanctions within the firm, such as scoldings or a lack of promotions, are
likely to be more relevant to most firms than reliance on sanctions
imposed by the racial community from which a worker is drawn.
Epstein's arguments also have a circularity to them. Consider
the following characterization of the informal contract argument.
Because of past racial segregation, members of different races live in
different communities. Because members of different races live in
different communities, informal sanctions are more effective where
members of a single race are employed together. Employing members
of a single race together likely implies some degree of racial
homogeneity in communities. Therefore, racial segregation is desirable.
Segregation thus justifies segregation. If, on the other hand, segregation
were outlawed, perhaps at the employer level, segregated communities
are more likely to break down, and racial segregation may no longer be
the effective contract enforcement mechanism that Epstein suggests.
Finally, in drawing his policy conclusion that antidiscrimination
policies are inefficient, Epstein appears to assume that the efficiency
effects of discrimination trump any efficiency effects of
antidiscrimination legislation. Donohue argues that antidiscrimination
legislation may be efficient in hastening the exit of employers who
discriminate simply due to their tastes for discrimination. Moreover,
discrimination may entail negative externalities. Epstein's analysis does
not affect these conclusions, but simply points out that banning
discrimination altogether may entail some inefficiencies. Noting that,
"there is nothing which says that Title VII could operate with laserlike
precision so as to achieve its goal and nothing more,"18 he then
concludes that banning discrimination is more harmful than allowing it.
This is simply an a priori assumption without theoretical or empirical
support.
1 7 J.H. Verkerke, "Free to Search" (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 2080 at 2088.
18 Epstein, supra note 2 at 77.
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Following Epstein's assumption that antidiscrimination laws are
blunt instruments (that is, discerning the motivation for discrimination is
impossible), it may well be that the efficiency gains from legally
prohibiting discrimination outright (that is, race can never be a negative
factor in hiring) dominate the efficiencies from legally allowing it
outright. This, as stated above, is an empirical question not resolvable
by a priori assertions. Donohue provides rough estimates of the costs of
Title VII, such as litigation costs, compliance costs and productivity
costs, as well as "best case," "middle case," and "worst case" estimates of
the benefits of Title VII, such as the psychic benefits of the law to those
opposed to bigotry, and concludes that only in the worst case would the
law be inefficient.1 9 Epstein's analysis thus fails to discredit efficiency
explanations for antidiscrimination legislation. The following discussion
of the potential inefficiencies arising from signaling equilibria
strengthens this conclusion.
IV. RACE AND DEFICIENT INFORMATION
A. Efficient Discrimination
Various authors have suggested that race acts as a proxy for
more detailed information about a person that is costly to gatherO In
auto insurance markets, for example, firms will base their assessment of
the risks associated with a particular driver on characteristics such as age
and sex, rather than making a more thorough but more costly
examination of the individual's driving ability. Similarly, in making
hiring decisions it is argued that firms may rely on race as a proxy for
more detailed information about a prospective employee. Richard
Posner outlines "statistical discrimination" in the following way:
If experience has taught me (perhaps incorrectly) that most Mycenaeans have a strong
garlic breath, I can economize on information costs by declining to join a club that
accepts Mycenaeans as members. To be sure, I may thereby be forgoing a valuable
association with some Mycenaeans who do not have a strong garlic breath, but the costs
19 "Efficient?," supra note 10.
20 For pioneering work in the area, see A.M. Spence, Market Signaling: Informational Transfer
in Hiring and Related Screening Processes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); and E.S.
Phelps, "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism" (1972) 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 659. More recent
discussions include, MacIntosh, supra note 7; C.R. Sunstein, "Why Markets Don't Stop
Discrimination" (1991) 8 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 22.; and D.A. Strauss, "The Law and Economics of
Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards" (1991) 79 Geo. L.J.
1619 [hereinafter "Numerical Standards"].
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in valuable associations forgone may be smaller than the information costs of making a
more extensive sampling of Mycenaeans. 21
Posner also draws the empirical conclusion that "[i]n recent times, ... the
most important factor responsible for discrimination probably has been
information costs." 22 This analysis leads him to refer to the assertion
that "much discrimination may be efficient" as a "fact." 23
Posner's notion of efficiency, which I adopt here, is
wealth-maximization. While his conclusion is plausible if the market
relied only upon proxies that are correlated with the underlying
information sought, there should be no confidence that the market will
eliminate proxies unrelated to the information sought; that is, rational
actors may rely on inaccurate stereotypes. As Michael Spence originally
pointed out in his pioneering treatise on market signaling, even if race
(the informational proxy) and ability (the underlying information
sought) are uncorrelated, the market may nevertheless rely upon race as
a proxy, as the next section will discuss.24 Consequently, wealth might be
lower as a result of reliance upon race as a statistical indicator.
B. Market Signaling
Consider Spence's model of education, race and hiring. All
prospective workers, White or Black, are either of high ability
(productivity) or of low ability. All White and Black workers with high
ability have exactly the same ability, and all low-ability workers of either
race have exactly the same ability. Furthermore, the ratio of high- to
low-ability workers is identical in the Black and White populations-race
and ability are uncorrelated. These productivities are given; human
capital is fixed. Employers cannot observe the ability of a worker until
she is hired. For simplicity, it is assumed that workers cannot invest in
human capital, but they can invest in signaling activities, specifically,
education 2 5 The key assumption for Spence's model is that the cost of
signaling (obtaining a certain level of education) is inversely related to
ability. Thus, a high-ability person has a lower cost of reaching a given
21 Posner, supra note 2 at 362.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid at 363.
24 Spence, supra note 20. See also Macintosh, supra note 7 at 284-85.
25 It is assumed that education does not contribute to the human capital of a worker. This
assumption will be dropped below.
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level of education than a low-ability person. By attaining a level of
education that differentiates themselves from low-ability workers, high-
ability workers signal to employers that they should be paid the high-
ability wage. That is, in a separating equilibrium (i.e., a signaling
equilibrium which allows employers to distinguish high from low-ability
workers), the increase in future wages from signaling a high ability is less
(greater) than the cost of the education for the low-ability (high-ability)
worker. Note that there is an assumed cost to hiring and adjusting wages
after productivity is observed, perhaps, Spence suggests, because it takes
some time before productivity is observed and specific on-the-job
training is required.
Equilibrium in this model is reached through successive
iterations of observing education levels, observing productivity levels of
workers (which are perfectly observable only after the worker is hired),
modifying employer beliefs about education and ability, and hiring.
Eventually, employer beliefs about education and ability are self-
confirming; high-ability workers will signal in a manner consistent with
employer beliefs about the signal required to infer high ability.
Given the assumption that the distributions of ability over the
Black and White populations are identical, one might assume that race
would not helpfully inform the employer and she will discard such
information. This, however, does not necessarily hold. If,
notwithstanding their intrinsic equality, White and Black workers are
viewed at some point by employers as distinct groups with respect to
ability, the signaling equilibrium that emerges may be entirely different
within each group. The signaling equilibrium is reached through the
external effects of an individual's education decision; an employer hires
the individual and then the employer updates her beliefs about ability
and education. If, however, races are viewed as distinct by employers, an
individual's education decision will have an external effect only on other
members of the race of that individual. For example, suppose that
employers consider Black and White people as distinct in ability, and
that at some point in time the Black and White population invested in
education in different ways, perhaps because of historical prejudice that
prevented Black students from attending universities. Since employers
view Black and White workers as distinct, beliefs about ability and
education are updated separately for each group; there is no external
effect from a White worker's investment in education on employers'
beliefs about Black workers and education.
In this situation it is possible for distinct signaling equilibria to be
reached for Black and White workers, even though there is no inherent
difference between them with respect to ability. Indeed, it is possible, as
1998]
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Spence shows,2 6 that members of a race (for example, Black people) will
refrain from investing in signaling (the cost to high-ability Black workers
of differentiating themselves from low-ability Black workers is greater
than the increase in wages that they would earn), while a "separating"
equilibrium exists for members of another race (White people) such that
high-ability White workers invest in education. In this situation, White
and Black workers are treated differently (no Black worker is paid the
high-ability wage) by employers who have acted rationally, yet there is
no inherent difference in the ability of Black and White workers.
Ian Ayres describes the possibility of a similar phenomenon in
the car sales market in Chicago 2 7 After sending various testers out to
negotiate car prices, he found that Black buyers of automobiles were on
average quoted higher prices than were White buyers even though there
was little difference in their presentation to the salespeople. He
observes:
Beliefs that are based on erroneous stereotypes may not be tested by the market
equilibrium. If market experience does not teach sellers that their preconceptions are
false, disparate treatment that is both inequitable and inefficient will persist. For
example, if sellers refuse to bargain seriously with blacks because they believe that blacks
generally are too poor to purchase cars, then in equilibrium blacks will continue to fail to
purchase cars--because of inflated, nonbargained prices. That failure will only reaffirm
the sellers' original mistaken belief.2 8
The assertion by commentators such as Posner that much
discrimination is efficient is challenged by this analysis. Employers may
rely on inaccurate stereotypes and it is possible for Black and White
workers to be treated differently even though there is no inherent
difference in their abilities. High-ability Black workers might therefore
be underemployed in highly skilled positions because of inaccurate
beliefs about their signals. This model creates a justification for legally
prohibiting reliance on race in making hiring decisions. If hiring is
colourblind, then the educational signaling equilibrium will be identical
for both races; the external effects of an individual's education decision
in updating employer beliefs will extend to all workers, not just to
members of the individual's own race.
26 Spence, supra note 20 at 36.
27 1. Ayres, "Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations"
(1991) 104 Harv. L. Rev. 817 [hereinafter "Fair Driving"]. See also I. Ayres, "Further Evidence of
Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of its Cause" (1995) 94 Mich. L. Rev. 109,
which relies on a slightly different methodology from that of the earlier study, but confirms the
finding of the earlier study that Black car buyers receive less attractive offers than White buyers.
Ayres concludes that statistical discrimination may explain this disparate treatment, at least in part.
28 "Fair Drivifig," supra note 27 at 850-51.
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C. Human Capital Investment
Extending Spence's model strengthens this policy conclusion.
Following MacIntosh, assume now that individuals are capable of
investing in human capital.29 By assumption, human capital is
accumulated outside of formal education (which operates only as a
signal). As before, assume that employers use race as an information
proxy in making hiring decisions, and, for the moment, assume that no
other indicator of ability is available. If, perhaps owing to historical
deprivation, Black workers were at some point in time of lower
productivity in some occupations, then employers at that time would be
reluctant to hire Black workers for highly skilled positions.
Consequently, there is little incentive for Black workers to invest in
human capital that would allow them to perform highly skilled jobs, as
they will not be offered such positions. White workers, on the other
hand, are aware that they will be offered these positions, and will invest
in human capital so as to ensure that they are capable of performing
(and therefore keeping) these jobs. As a result, the beliefs of the
employer are self-confirming over time: Black workers will be of lower
productivity because they face less incentive to invest in human capital
because employers believe them to be of lower productivity. Such a
process has been described as "adverse selection"-Black workers will
rationally self-select themselves out of the high-ability market.
Now assume that prospective workers may signal ability by
investing in education (which by assumption does not add to their
human capital; this assumption is dropped below). The possibility of
independently signaling ability (which is now a function of innate
abilities and the accumulation of human capital) does not change this
fundamental conclusion. Even if some signaling of ability is possible, an
initial bias against Black workers will have lingering human capital
effects so long as employers continue to use race as an informational
proxy. As MacIntosh states:
29 The discussion that follows draws on MacIntosh, supra note 7, which in turn drew on
Spence, supra note 20; and G.A. Akerlof "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism" (1970) 84 Q.J. Econ. 488. For early discussions of the adverse effects of
discrimination on human capital investment, see S.J. Lundberg & R. Startz, "Private Discrimination
and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets" (1983) 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 340; and K.
Arrow, "Models of Job Discrimination" in A.H. Pascal, ed., Racial Discrimination in Economic Life
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972) 83. More recent discussions include, "A Reply," supra
note 10; Sunstein, supra note 20; "Numerical Standards," supra note 20; and L. Audain, "Critical
Cultural Law and Economics, The Culture of Deindividualization, The Paradox of Blackness"
(1995) 70 Ind. L.J. 709.
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While there is reason to believe that the ability to signal will soften the segmentation of
the labour market, there can be no confidence that it will eradicate it. An employer who
continues to use race as a proxy for ability, albeit tempered by the use of other proxies,
will depreciate the informational content of a signal by a member of Race Y as compared
to a member of Race X. ... [E]ven where applicants have an ability to signal their quality,
employer beliefs will continue to shape the market of applicants from Race Y in such a
manner as to result in a lower average skill level for members of Race Y, confirming
initial employer expectations. 3 0
This model also creates a justification for legally eliminating the
use of race as a proxy for ability in hiring decisions. If race is eliminated
as a proxy, there will be, perhaps, initial costs since currently
underqualified Black employees will be hired, but the distortion of
incentives for human capital investment will be corrected, thereby
enhancing long-run efficiency. While it is an empirical question, it is
plausible to assume that, on balance, the costs of eliminating racial
proxies will be dominated by the social benefits of more efficient human
capital investment among high-ability Black workers 3 1
D. Education as Both a Signal and Human Capital Investment
Consider now a model where the signaling investment, perhaps
years of education, also contributes to human capital. Only in a special
case would the adverse selection problem described above (the rational
underinvestment in human capital by high-ability Black workers)
disappear.
In the special case, human capital investment is the sole
determinant of productivity; human capital investment perfectly
coincides with signaling investment, and employers know this to be true.
For example, productivity is solely determined by education, and
employers know this. In this case, proxies such as race, age, or other
fixed characteristics ("indices" in Spence's language) would not be used,
since productivity is exclusively determined by education. An employer
need only examine education to infer productivity.
If, however, the assumptions are changed slightly, this result
changes drastically. If there is a residual determinant of productivity
other than human capital investment, employers may use proxies in an
effort to predict this residual ability. Alternatively, if there are means of
investing in human capital other than education, proxies may be used to
attempt to predict the likely investment in human capital outside of
30 MacIntosh, supra note 7 at 287-88.
31 Ibid. at 292.
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education. In both cases, the use of proxies may be established. If race
is selected as a proxy, then arbitrarily different signaling equilibria
between Black and White people may emerge, as shown above. The fact
that education itself contributes to productivity does not change this
conclusion.
Furthermore, if employers discount Black workers' signals, they
will have less incentive to invest in education, and thus will fail to
disconfirm the employers' beliefs about their productivity. The overlap
of human capital investment and signaling will generally not eliminate
either arbitrary differences in treatment of Black and White workers or
the adverse selection problem. Thus, the policy conclusion drawn above
-that efficiency considerations may justify eliminating the use of race in
assessing prospective job candidates-is equally appropriate where
signaling investment also contributes to human capital.
V. DIFFERENTIAL SIGNALING COSTS
The above signaling models are driven by the employers'
assumption that race and ability are correlated. This falls short of a
strictly neutral attitude towards race. Even in the face of signals of
ability, such as education, employers in the above signaling models
continue to view race as a relevant proxy for ability. While this may be
self-perpetuating, particularly where members of a race rationally
underinvest in human capital, if for some reason employers came to
believe that, starting today, all races were created equally, the efficiency
costs of discrimination would disappear. Indeed, this is the justification
for the position that employers be compelled legally to ignore race in
making hiring decisions. On the other hand, if there are real differences
between races, particularly with respect to signaling costs, ignoring race
may in fact induce inefficient results, as the following sections will
discuss.
A. Market Signaling with Differential Signaling Costs
In the above model of market signaling, it was assumed that
Black and White workers have identical abilities, and that they have
identical signaling costs. Following Spence, consider now a model where
Black people have higher signaling costs than White people, but the
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groups are in all other relevant aspects identical.3 2 In this model, if a
Black person of high ability achieves a level of education equal to a
White person of the same ability, the Black person has incurred greater
costs in reaching this level. Put another way, if a Black person and
White person of equal ability incur identical signaling costs, the Black
person will have reached a lower level of education.
To provide the differential signaling cost model with an
empirical frame of reference, this discussion will consider the case of
African-Americans, although other groups in other nations would likely
be equally appropriate. As Trebilcock observes: "The statistics on the
current economic and social status of Blacks paint a grim picture."33
Consider the economic and social differences between White and Black
people. African-Americans are more than twice as likely than White
Americans to be jobless. The median Black family income is 56 per cent
of a White family's income. While only 10 per cent of White people live
below the poverty line, almost a third of Black people live below the
poverty line. Two-thirds of African-American babies are born to
unmarried mothers. Black men are six times more likely to be murdered
than White men. While Black people comprise 12 per cent of America's
population, they constitute nearly half of its prison population. Finally,
only 2.5 per cent of America's college students are Black men.34
In the face of these statistics, it would be naive to imagine a level
playing field in pursuing an education; the economic situation facing
Black students would make education difficult enough. On top of
economic disadvantage, however, there also may be non-pecuniary costs
of education creating further disadvantage for African-Americans, as I
will attempt to demonstrate. According to empirical evidence, the
influence of culture on a person's pursuit of education is very significant;
for example, whether a person's parents were highly educated has an
influence (independent of income) on whether that person will succeed
academically. Consider the following studies. John Chubb and Terry
Moe examined the effect of various factors, such as school organization,
32 See Spence, supra note 20, c. 5; and Macintosh, supra note 7 at 289-90. MacIntosh suggests
that differential signaling costs may result from the adverse selection problem and human capital
underinvestment that he describes, noting, for example, that disadvantaged groups may find it
difficult to finance an education. In the discussion below, I will focus on the potential for differing
psychic costs of obtaining an education.
33 Trebilcock, supra note 1 at 191.
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resources and family background, on the academic success of high
school students in the United States.35 They stated:
The strongest and most consistent finding in research on student achievement is that
family background is a major influence, perhaps even a decisive one. It is a major
influence in the home, where parents establish basic educational values and scholastic
work habits.36
Eric Hanushek reviewed over one hundred studies on the
influence of various factors on academic achievement and finds that the
level of education obtained by parents is an important factor.3 7 He
concluded: "[Flamily background is clearly very important in explaining
differences in achievement. Virtually regardless of how measured, more
educated and more wealthy parents have children who perform better
on average."38
Alan Gordon surveyed the literature on the social status of
attendees of institutions of higher education and concluded:
Parents' experiences of post-compulsory education certainly influence their attitudes
towards whether their children should continue their studies after the age of sixteen or
eighteen. In sixth forms, further education and higher education, students whose parents
had themselves continued in full-time education are over-represented.... [Tihe amount
of influence parents have over their child's decision to stay on in or leave full-time
education was strongly associated with the amount of education they themselves had
received. ... [M]ore highly educated parents generally take more interest in their
children's schooling.3 9
Alexander Astin conducted an extensive study attempting to
predict college performance based on numerous possible explanatory
variables.4 0 After studying the results of 4,031 men and 3,783 women in
American colleges, Astin concluded that the education of a student's
parents had a significant effect (holding all other things equal) on
academic performance. He stated: "Although race and family income
do not appear to affect the student's academic performance directly, the
35 See J.E. Chubb & T.M. Moe, Politics, Markets and America's Schools (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1990) c. 4.
36 Ibid. at 101.
37 E.A. Hanushek, "The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public
Schools" (1986) 24 J. Econ. Lit. 1141.
3 8 Ibid at 1163.
39 A. Gordon, "The Educational Choices of Young People" in 0. Fulton, ed.,Access to Higher
Education (Guildford, U.K.: Society for Research into Higher Education, 1981) 122 at 127.
40 A.W. Astin, PredictingAcademic Performance in College (New York: Free Press, 1971).
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parents' level of education has a positive effect on freshman GPA,
particularly for girls." 41
Finally, an earlier study by Byron Hollinshead reached similar
conclusions. 42 He concluded from his study of college students in
America that:
One of the crucial factors in determining college attendance is family attitude. If there is
a family college tradition, if there is family respect for learning, then the youngster will go
even at considerable sacrifice. ... If there is no such tradition or respect, the youngster is
not likely to go, even though there may be plenty of money to send him.43
The implications of these studies are clear: it is more difficult for
children whose parents did not receive higher education to receive
higher education themselves. If a child is not exposed to a culture with
an emphasis on education, it is more difficult for that child to break the
mould and attend institutions of higher education. Thus, a legacy of
discrimination against a particular race will have a lasting impact on the
ability of members of that race to gain an education, aside from
economic impediments. Fewer children will be exposed to parents who
have obtained an education, and, to the extent that race and culture are
correlated, children in the disadvantaged group are less likely to be
exposed to a culture which is conducive to education. Returning to the
question at hand, if Black people have historically been discriminated
against in a such a way that their educational opportunities were limited,
this will have a lasting impact on future generations. This is consistent
with the observation noted above that only 2.5 per cent of the American
college population are Black men, and is supported by an article in The
New York Times Magazine, which stated:
Every child born in America doesn't have access to good schools and doesn't have
parents who encourage study.... To argue that by late adolescence black people have run
a fair competitive race and that if they're behind whites on the educational standards they
deserve to be permanently barred from the professional and managerial classes is
absurd.44
It is a reasonable assumption that the costs of education, defined broadly
as including the psychic costs of the effort required to attend and
succeed at an educational institution, are higher for a Black American
than for a White American of equal ability.
41 Ibid at 281.
42 B.S. Hollinshead, Who Should Go to College (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).
43 Jbid, at 37.
44 N. Lemann, "Taking Affirmative Action Apart" New York Times Magazine (11 June 1995)
36 at 62.
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The policy implications of a model with differential signaling
costs differ sharply from the implications of the above signaling models.
In the above models, it was shown that if race was treated as a proxy for
ability, arbitrary differences in signaling equilibria could arise; banning
the use of race as a proxy may therefore eliminate arbitrary differences,
and possible inefficiencies owing to the underutilization of high-ability
Black workers and the adverse selection problem, in the treatment of
Black and White workers. The implication of differential signaling costs,
however, is that such a policy recommendation may be misguided. If the
use of race in hiring is banned, Black workers will be unfairly treated and
inefficiently underutilized. The reason for this is as follows: because of
the higher costs of education, a Black person with lower education levels
may signal the same ability as a White person with higher education
levels. If they are treated similarly with respect to signaling, they will be
treated differently with respect to ability. Therefore, if there are
differential costs of signaling for Black and White people, allowing
employers to use race as a proxy is appropriate.
Spence suggested that the difference in signaling costs will be
recognized and compensated for by the market, if permitted. He stated:
"The unprejudiced employer will tend, in making his probabilistic
assessments, to compensate for the higher signaling costs facing one
group. He will do this automatically in interpreting past market data.
He need not be aware that education costs more for B [Black people]
than for W [White people]." 4s Thus, in the unregulated market, what
appears to be reverse discrimination will result. Black people will be
hired for highly-skilled jobs, even though their level of education is
below White people who seek highly skilled jobs. Indeed, if education
costs vary sufficiently, a Black person could be hired for a highly-skilled
job even though his education level is below that of a White person
offered an unskilled job. In this case, an efficient sorting of skilled and
unskilled labour in the different races results in what this article defines
as affirmative action: a Black person with ostensibly lower qualifications
may be hired over a White person with ostensibly higher qualifications. 46
The conclusion that the market will sort out the different
equilibria, however, depends on some crucial assumptions. One
assumption made by Spence is that in the unregulated market employers
view race as a proxy for ability; that is, it is possible for different
4 5 Spence, supra note 20 at 38.
46 See M. Selmi, "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and The Affirmative Action Debate"
(1995) 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1251 (voluntary affirmative action programs may be efficient for
employers as a means of compensating for biases in the testing of prospective employees).
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signaling equilibria to be reached since Black and White people are
viewed as distinct. If, however, employers do not view Black and White
workers as inherently different (perhaps as the result of
antidiscrimination campaigns) and all prospective employees are lumped
together, then there is a danger that high-ability Black people will again
be underutilized. Ceteris paribus, the relatively high cost of education
implies that Black people will on average attain lower levels of education
than White people, which implies that they will be underemployed in
high-ability positions. In other words, somewhat paradoxically,
colourblind policies in hiring may lead to underemployment of Black
workers.
The signaling equilibrium created when the races are treated
equally with respect to signaling, but education costs differ, may result in
highly educated White workers being hired for high-ability jobs, while
Black and lesser-educated White workers are hired for low-ability jobs.
In this situation, employers may not be presented with disconfirming
evidence of their beliefs that identical education levels signal identical
abilities across races.47 Consequently, beliefs will not be updated, and
an equilibrium could result whereby Black and White employees are
treated similarly at the signaling level, even though efficiency calls for
separate treatment. Spence acknowledges this point and observes, "if
education costs more for one group, that group may never appear in the
market, and the employers' beliefs are unchallenged." 48
This possibility suggests that policy should not be as sanguine
about the market's ability to recognize differences in education costs as
Spence initially suggested. Rather than simply allowing firms to
differentiate between Black and White people in hiring, a different
policy option may be to compel employers to hire Black workers in
highly skilled jobs in order to learn more about the relationship between
race, education and ability. As Spence states: "If we were to force some
members of the currently excluded group into the market, employers
would eventually learn that a given level of education implies more
talent for that group, because education costs at given levels of capability
are uniformly higher."49 Thus, differential signaling costs may not
simply imply a permissive attitude towards what appears to be reverse
4 7 See "Fair Driving," supra note 27 at 850-51; and Selmi, supra note 46 at 1294-95.
4 8 Spence, supra note 20 at 99.
49 Ibid. See also "Numerical Standards," supra note 20 at 1650-51; and J.M. Buchanan,
"Fairness, Hope and Justice" in R. Skurski, ed., New Directions in Economic Justice (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) 53 (arguing that if employers are ill-informed about the
productivity of a particular group in society, temporary mandatory hiring quotas are appropriate).
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discrimination, but rather may imply the optimality of a coercive policy
towards employers, at least until the market is aware of differential
signaling costs.
An alternative policy option, however, is to attack the source of
the difference between the races: the costs of education. Thus far the
differential costs of signaling between Black and White workers has been
taken as a given. If the costs of education for Black workers are lowered
to levels facing White workers, education levels for either race will signal
the same ability. The above summary of the empirical evidence on
culture and education offers one method of lowering disadvantaged
groups' education costs: affirmative action programs at colleges and
universities, whereby, for example, Black students are admitted with
lower formal academic credentials than some rejected White students.S0
If more Black people attend university, their children are more likely to
attend university, and the culture will become more congenial for a
Black person wishing to attain an education. If, as the above studies
suggest, culture is one of the main sources of differential education
costs, a more efficient equilibrium might be reached over time through
these policies.
B. Differential Signaling Costs and Human Capital Investment
Consider now the effect of differential signaling costs on human
capital investment, where signaling activities and human capital
investment are distinct (that is, human capital is accumulated outside of
formal education-this assumption will be dropped below). The
problem that may result is similar to the adverse selection problem
(rational underinvestment in human capital by high-ability members of a
disadvantaged group) described above, except that this problem can
result even if employers cease to use race as a proxy for ability. Suppose
now that employers do not account for race in making hiring decisions.
High-ability Black workers may be underemployed since they will be
disadvantaged in signaling their ability. If high-ability Black workers
know that they will be underemployed, there is a disincentive for them to
invest in human capital. As a result, the underemployment of Black
50 Macintosh, supra note 7 at 293-95, makes a similar observation, noting the possibility of
differential signaling costs and suggesting that an effective means of combating the adverse
selection problem is perhaps to pursue subsidies and lower admission standards with respect to
education. The analysis here complements his observations, pointing out that lower admission
standards may not only help in the present by compensating for differential signaling costs, but will
also help in the future by lowering signaling costs for disadvantaged groups.
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workers becomes rational, since they will be less productive. Thus, in
this model, an initial assumption by employers that Black workers are
less productive is not required for an adverse selection problem to result.
Indeed, if Black and White workers are assumed to be identical in all
relevant aspects even though there are differential signaling costs, the
adverse selection problem may result.
There are, as was true with the basic model of differential
signaling costs, two possible policy responses to this problem. First,
employers could be compelled to hire Black workers in order to discover
the relationship between their education levels and abilities. Once this is
learned, the adverse selection problem might disappear. Employers may
compensate for the higher costs of signaling and hire high-ability Black
workers even though they have lower formal education credentials, and
Black workers will anticipate this and invest in human capital so that
they will be able to perform highly-skilled jobs.
Alternatively, the signaling cost differential could be eliminated.
As suggested above, affirmative action programs in colleges and
universities may help eliminate the cost difference in obtaining an
education for Black and White students. If this difference is eliminated,
Black and White prospective employees will have equal signaling
capacities, and colourblind treatment of prospective employees by
employers will result in the employment of high-ability Black workers.
High-ability Black workers will anticipate this and will invest in human
capital (outside of education) so as to be capable of performing highly
skilled jobs; the adverse selection problem is resolved.
C. Differential Education Costs Where Education is Both
a Signal and Human Capital Investment
The policy implications of differential costs of education where
education acts both as a signal and as human capital investment are
distinct from the policy implications of the above models where
education is simply a signal. Assume that education is both a signal and
human capital investment, and that Black people face a higher cost of
education. Assume also that employers are unaware of this difference
and treat Black and White job candidates identically. Higher signaling
costs imply that it will be more difficult for Black workers to signal high-
ability to employers, and they may consequently be underemployed.
This may diminish their incentive to invest in education, which implies a
lower level of human capital, which in turn leaves underemployment of
Black workers rational.
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In the above models with differential education costs, compelling
employers to hire Black workers to educate them about race, ability, and
signaling will result in employers compensating for greater signaling
costs and efficiently hiring high-ability Black workers. In this model,
however, the signaling activity itself contributes to ability through gains
in human capital. Black workers will therefore be at a disadvantage in
competing for highly skilled jobs and may self-select themselves out of
this market. Such a result, while inequitable, may or may not be
inefficient. In the short run, it might be efficient in that skilled jobs will
be allocated to those with lower costs of investing in human capital. On
the other hand, it may be desirable in the long term to lower the
education costs of Black people such that high-ability Black workers
have an incentive to invest in signaling and human capital. To
accomplish this long-term objective, the second policy option discussed
above is required: affirmative action at educational institutions. If
affirmative action programs in colleges and universities lower education
costs for Black students as described above, then the underemployment
of high-ability Black workers will be diminished over time.
VI. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the following sections, I will first summarize the preceding
analysis and then will use the theory to assess Canadian and American51
constitutional approaches to antidiscrimination and affirmative action
policies. While the optimality of particular laws Will depend on the
social context in which they are implemented, the above analysis informs
what governments should be constitutionally permitted to enact with
respect to antidiscrimination laws and affirmative action, at least from
an efficiency perspective.
A. Summary
This article began by assessing the efficiency effects of
discrimination motivated by employer animus toward particular races.
Under this model, antidiscrimination policies may be efficient in
reducing negative externalities resulting from acts of racism. Moreover,
51 In Part VI(B)(2), below, I will focus only on the recent case law of the United States
Supreme Court.
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they may hasten the exit of discriminatory employers from the market,
and thus allow society to reach a higher level of social welfare sooner
than the unregulated market would permit. Under this model,
therefore, antidiscrimination policies may be efficient.
The efficiency effects of discrimination motivated not by animus,
but by the efficiency of homogeneity were then discussed. Analysis of
this theory suggests that it depends on questionable premises, and, even
accepting its premises, its conclusion that allowing discrimination is
efficient on balance is unwarranted.
The signaling models offer varying policy implications. Posner
suggests that banning discrimination is inefficient as it would prevent
employers from economizing on information costs by using race as a
proxy for other factors such as productivity. As the discussion of the
signaling models indicates, however, there is no assurance that the
market will efficiently eliminate inappropriate proxies.
The discussion of signaling and human capital investment where
signaling costs are the same across races suggests that banning racial
discrimination in hiring altogether may be economically efficient. If race
is permitted to be used by employers in assessing prospective employees,
arbitrary differences in the treatment of the races may emerge.
Furthermore, the difference in treatment of a race may have self-
fulfilling implications through the adverse selection process.
Consequently, high-ability members of a particular race may be
underemployed. Thus, according to these models, employers should be
prevented from relying on race in making hiring decisions.
This conclusion does not hold if there are differential signaling
costs. Under these models, treating races equally results in disadvantage
for members of the high-signaling-cost race. Consequently, if hiring
policies are colourblind, high-ability members of the high-signaling-cost
race will be underemployed. These models suggest that if employers are
aware of the differential signaling costs, employers should be permitted
legally to treat members of the high-signaling-cost race favourably, in the
sense of hiring members of this race with lower formal qualifications. If,
however, employers are initially unaware of the differential in signaling
costs and treat races identically, inefficient underemployment of high-
signaling-cost races may persist, since employers will not necessarily face
any evidence disconfirming their beliefs; indeed, rational under-
investment in human capital might justify these beliefs. In this case, two
policy responses may be appropriate: compelling employers to hire
members of the high-signaling-cost race; and eliminating the differential
in signaling costs. This latter objective might be accomplished by
affirmative action programs in educational institutions. If the signaling
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activity-education-also contributes to human capital, eliminating
signaling cost differentials may ensure efficient employment of all races
in the long run.
B. Relevant Constitutional Law in Canada and the United States
This section will draw on the above economic analysis to assess
the constitutional laws governing discrimination and affirmative action
practiced by government actors in their capacities as legislators and
employers in Canada and the United States. As previously stated,
whether a particular law or program is efficient will depend on the
empirical circumstances; thus, the analysis will generally focus on what
governments are constitutionally permitted to do, not a particular law or
program itself.52
1. Canada
Section 15 of the Charter states:
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, programme or activity that has asits object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability.
Section 15(1) sets out the general rule that governments as
employers or as legislators cannot make distinctions on the basis of race.
Such a general rule is consistent with the economic analysis herein. It
clearly allows the government to establish antidiscrimination legislation
which may, following John Donohue, serve to accelerate the process
whereby bigoted employers are driven from the market.
Antidiscrimination legislation and a rule generally preventing the
government from legislatively creating distinctions on the basis of race
may also help prevent the development of arbitrary differences in
52 The exception in the discussion that follows will be a specific assessment of the prohibition
of discrimination by the government as employer: see discussion below.
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signaling equilibria across races which, as Ayres observes, are
"inequitable and inefficient." 53
In its role as employer, section 15(1) prevents the government
from discriminating on the basis of race.54 While generally I attempt in
this article to avoid any firm conclusion on whether a specific rule is
desirable in a particular context, but rather set out general reasons
suggesting the plausible efficiency of a type of law, the inflexible
prohibition in section 15(1) with respect to government's role as an
employer invites a firm assessment of whether governments should not
be allowed to discriminate as employers.
While the efficiency arguments for and against
antidiscrimination laws generally apply equally to government, an
important argument does not: the argument that market competition
itself will drive out discrimination motivated by animus, and thus the law
need not intrude. As MacIntosh points out, governments as employers
are typically insulated from marketplace competition; therefore, the
argument that the unregulated market will eliminate discrimination
motivated by animus since bigoted employers face higher costs does not
apply to the government 5 5 It is plausible that antidiscrimination laws
are justified on an efficiency basis even in the face of Becker's argument,
but the failure of this argument with* respect to the government helps
justify the outright prohibition of employment discrimination by the
government.
Particular aspects of section 15(1) case law have developed in
ways that are consistent with the framework developed in this article,
suggesting the potential efficiency-enhancing property of Canadian law.
I will discuss two issues in the case law here: whether discrimination
need be intentional in order to attract scrutiny under section 15(1); and
whether the person seeking the protection of section 15(1) must be a
member of an historically disadvantaged group. After assessing the case
law on these topics, I will assess the explicit treatment of affirmative
action in section 15(2) and its relationship to section 15(1).
It is apparent under section 15(1) case law that the subsection is
relevant even where the state action in question is not intended to
53 "Fair Driving," supra note 27 at 850.
54 While s. 15(1) refers only to discriminatory "law," McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter McKinney] held that discriminatory policies or practices by a government
employer were "law" for the purposes of s. 15(1).
55 See MacIntosh, supra note 7 at 300-301.
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disadvantage the group in question.5 6 McIntyre J., for the majority on
this point, used the phrase "whether intentional or not" in defining
discrimination in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.5 7 He also
adopted the Court's cases on human rights codes into section 15(1)
jurisprudence establishing that discrimination under the codes need not
be intentional.58 From these observations, Peter Hogg concludes that:
It follows that it is not necessary to show that the purpose of the challenged law was to
impose a disadvantage on a person by reason of his or her race, national or ethnic origin,
etc. It is enough to show that the effect of the law is to impose a disadvantage on a person
by reference to one of the listed or analogous characteristics.5 9
Aside from other important, equitable considerations, the
analysis here suggests that the rule in Andrews may have desirable
efficiency properties. The intention to disadvantage a race need not be
present in order for state action to create inefficient discrimination.
Consider a situation where there is no difference in signaling costs
between races and members of each race have equal ability. An
important insight of signaling theory is that even though there are no
fundamental differences between the races, if each race is viewed as
distinct, distinct signaling equilibria may result, which in turn may result
in the underemployment of high-ability members of a race and a
consequent adverse selection problem with respect to human capital
investment. The analysis of this article thus supports the Canadian
approach: intention to disadvantage a group is not required for state
action, either in the state's role as employer or as law-maker in the
employment context, to violate section 15(1).
A question that was not resolved as quickly in the history of
section 15(1) jurisprudence was whether the person claiming general
equality rights under section 15(1) is required to be a member of an
historically disadvantaged group.6 0 As Hogg discusses, the law has
56 See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) s. 52.7(h).
57 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 174 [hereinafter Andrews].
58 See, for example, Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.
59 Hogg, supra note 56, c. 52 at 41 [emphasis in original].
60 See O.W. Fiss," Groups and the Equal Protection Clause" (1976) 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107
(arguing that unequal treatment of members of advantaged races may be unfair, but should not be
considered unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause in the United States); and Ontario
Law Reform Commission, Study Paper on Litigating The Relationship Between Equity and Equality by
C. Sheppard (Toronto: The Commission, 1993) at 35-48 (discussing equality protection and
historically privileged groups).
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varied on this question.6 1 In Andrews, an individual claimed
discrimination under section 15(1) on the basis of his status as a
non-citizen. Wilson J., in the minority, described non-citizens as "a
group lacking in political power and as such vulnerable to having their
interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect
violated." 62 La Forest J. stated that non-citizens are a group "who are
relatively powerless politically, and whose interests are likely to be
compromised by legislative decisions." 63
The emphasis on pre-existing disadvantage in Andrews was
echoed in R v. Turpin.64 In that case, Wilson J. for a unanimous Court
required the claimant under section 15(1) to establish general, historical
disadvantage as well as particular disadvantage from the state action in
question. She stated: "A finding that there is discrimination will, I think,
in most but perhaps not all cases, necessarily entail a search for
disadvantage that exists apart from and independent of the particular
legal distinction being challenged." 65 A claim without association to
historical disadvantage would not "advance the purposes of s. 15 in
remedying or preventing discrimination against groups suffering social,
political and legal disadvantage in our society"66 and therefore would be
outside the scope of section 15.
Subsequent cases departed from Wilson J.'s approach in Turpin.
R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen67 involved a man's section 15(1) claim of
discrimination on the basis of sex. Clearly males have enjoyed historical
advantage because of sex, but Wilson J. for the majority appeared to
proceed on the basis that men could successfully claim discrimination on
the basis of sex. McLachlin J., on behalf of a minority, explicitly rejected
the view that historical disadvantage, apart from particular disadvantage
from the state action in question, was required, stating "these arguments
take the language in Turpin further than is justified."68
61 Hogg, supra note 56, s. 52.7(g).
6 2 Andrews, supra note 57 at 152.
63 Ibid at 195.
64 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
65 1bidb at 1332.
66 1bid at 1333.
67 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906.
68 Ibid. at 943.
320 [VOL. 36 No. 2
Antidiscrimination and Economic Efficiency
Recently, Miron v. Trudel69 rejected more clearly the
requirement of historical disadvantage under section 15(1). Eight of
nine justices held that general disadvantage, while an indicator of an
analogous ground, was not a prerequisite to a claim under section 15(1).
In light of these and other cases, Hogg summarizes the law on
the requirement of general disadvantage in the following way:
An individual who invokes s. 15 need show only that a law imposes some disadvantage on
him or her, and does so by reason of a named or analogous (immutable) personal
characteristic. That is discrimination within s. 15. It is not necessary for the individual to
show that he or she is a member of group that is disadvantaged in other respects. Of
course, there may be a sound reason for a discriminatory law, especially if the burdened
group is one that is generally advantaged in other respects, but that is relevant under s.
1.70
The analysis here suggests that historical disadvantage, while
clearly relevant to affirmative action as I will discuss below, is not
necessary for inefficient discrimination to exist. Thus, the move away
from Wilson J.'s apparent view in Turpin should be welcomed, at least
from an efficiency perspective. Consider two races, each of equal ability
and each equally treated historically such that signaling costs are
identical across race. Employers use race for a proxy for ability. As
discussed above, the signaling equilibria that emerge for each race may
not resemble each other, even though there is no intrinsic difference
between the races. This differential treatment could lead to an adverse
selection problem and rational underinvestment in human capital by a
particular race. Requiring historical disadvantage under section 15(1)
could permit the creation of distinctions based on racial grounds that
could result in separate signaling equilibria for distinct races, with the
efficiency losses this entails,71
Turning to section 15(2), it is clear that, to some extent, this
section of the Charter permits affirmative action programs. Thus, to
some extent, the government as employer may practice affirmative
action, which economic analysis suggests may be efficient in order to
compensate for differential signaling costs across races. Moreover,
69 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
70 Hogg, supra note 56, c. 52 at 41.
71 Historical disadvantage, while it should not be a requirement to bring a s. 15(1) claim, may
nevertheless be relevant in assessing the claim. As I will argue below, an affirmative action program
designed to remedy or account for historical disadvantage pursuant to s. 15(2) may be consistent
with s. 15(1). Thus, members of an historically advantaged race seeking to challenge an affirmative
action program may fail to show that their substantive equaltiy rights under s. 15(1) have been
infringed. He should nevertheless have the right to challenge laws making arbitrary racial
distinctions in order to prevent the emergence of inefficient signaling equilibria.
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antidiscrimination legislation may permit private actors to practice
affirmative action, which may be efficient for the same reasons.
There is continuing debate, however, as to how permissive the
section is in accommodating government affirmative action initiatives.
One of the important issues in determining to what extent affirmative
action is constitutional is whether section 15(2) is an exception to the
general prohibition on racial discrimination in section 15(1), or whether
it is merely an interpretive guide to section 15(1). That is, is an
affirmative action program an infringement of section 15(1), but
justifiable under section 15(2), or is such a program consistent with
section 15(1) if it satisfies section 15(2)? In what follows I will set out
why this issue is important with respect to judicial review of affirmative
action, will set out what the economic analysis in this article suggests on
the issue, and will review aspects of the case law that indicate the
consistency of the theory herein with judicial approaches to the issue.
Whether section 15(2) merely informs section 15(1) analysis or
rather is a defence to what is otherwise a violation of section 15(1) is a
significant preliminary question in considering judicial review of
affirmative action. There are at least two ways in which the issue, which
I will call the relational question, will affect judicial review. First,
resolving the relational question is important in determining on whom
the burden of proof lies.72 If section 15(2) is a defence to what would
otherwise be a violation of section 15(1), the burden presumably would
rest on the government to prove that the affirmative action in question,
while violative of section 15(1), is "saved" by section 15(2). If, on the
other hand, section 15(2) informs section 15(1), then an affirmative
action program permitted pursuant to section 15(2) does not violate
section 15(1). Consequently, the burden of proof would rest on the
challenging party to show that the program is not authorized by section
15(2) and violates section 15(1). If section 15(2) is not an exemption to
section 15(1), but rather is an interpretive guide to section 15(1), there is
likely greater scope for permissible affirmative action given that the
burden of proof will rest on the party challenging the government action.
A second reason why resolving the relational question is
important is the standard of review entailed under either the defence
approach or the interpretive guide approach.7 3 If section 15(2) is a
defence to what otherwise would be a violation of section 15(1), it
should be construed narrowly. The government faces a significant
7 2 Sheppard, supra note 60 at 22.
73 Ibid. at 21-22.
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burden in justifying the violation of a right.74 On the other hand, if
section 15(2) merely informs section 15(1), then a liberal approach
should be taken. In interpreting constitutional rights, courts must follow
a "generous" and "purposive" approach.75 If section 15(2) is viewed as
helping define the equality rights of disadvantaged groups then it should
be interpreted generously. Again, the characterization of the
relationship between section 15(2) and section 15(1) will be significant in
determining the scope of permissible affirmative action under the
Charter.
Having established the stakes involved in characterizing section
15(2), I turn now to the implications of the economic analysis herein on
the question. There are two ways of approaching the question of the
optimal view of the relationship between sections 15(1) and 15(2). First,
one could characterize the purpose of each section and determine their
relationship from a comparison of purpose: if their purposes are
identical, then one should not be viewed as an exception to the other.
Second, one could take an instrumental, results-oriented approach. If
one wishes to restrict the scope of affirmative action, then one would
argue in favour of the exception approach to section 15(2), given that
such an approach places the burden on the government to justify
affirmative action and moreover suggests interpreting the exception
narrowly. On the other hand, treating section 15(2) as consistent with
section 15(1) opens the door to affirmative action by placing the burden
of proof on those challenging such a program and by suggesting a
generous, liberal approach to interpretation.
The second approach may be dealt with succinctly. The analysis
in this article has suggested the economic efficiency of affirmative action
programs in certain plausible circumstances. A restrictive approach to
section 15(2) may undermine the ability of the government to establish
and authorize such programs,7 6 thereby undermining the ability of
government to enhance economic efficiency. It raises empirical
questions beyond the scope of this article as to whether affirmative
action is appropriate in particular circumstances, but the analysis does
74 The general standard for justifying a rights infringement under s. 1 is set out in R. v. Oakes,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. Recent discussions of the government's justificatory burden in equality cases
may be found in Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358; Eldridge v. British
Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 [hereinafter Eldridge]; and Vriend v. Alberta (1998), 156
D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
75 SeeR. v. BigMDrug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344.
76 American experience has tended to confirm that a restrictive approach requiring
justification of affirmative action programs undermines the likelihood of finding them
constitutional, as I will discuss in the next section.
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suggest plausible reasons to suppose its efficiency in the presence of
significant historical disadvantage. Severely limiting the government's
ability to use affirmative action may therefore present efficiency costs.
I turn now to an approach based on a comparison of the
purposes of the two subsections of section 15. This article has argued
that affirmative action programs, whereby ostensibly less qualified
members of a disadvantaged race are hired in preference to members of
a different race because of differences in signaling costs, may be
necessary in order to treat the races equally with respect to ability. That
is, differential treatment with respect to signaling may be necessary to
ensure equal treatment with respect to ability. Moreover, affirmative
action in educational institutions may be necessary to lower the costs of
obtaining an education (signaling) for historically disadvantaged groups.
The affirmative action described in this article has the object of
establishing substantively equal treatment of different races with respect
to ability, in order to promote efficiency, even if unequal treatment is
required with respect to signaling. The object is not to redress past
wrongs or any other retrospective goal, 77 but rather to promote equal
treatment of races with respect to ability in the present and future.
Given that affirmative action as described herein has as its object
the promotion of equality, the economic analysis suggests that section
15(2) should be viewed as entirely consistent with the goals of section
15(1), which is also designed to promote equality. Affirmative action is
not an exception to the promotion of equality under this view, but
merely a means of pursuing it in contexts where types of equal
treatment, such as with respect to signaling, results in significant
inequality in other respects, such as with respect to ability.
"Disadvantage" in section 15(2) helps define the relationship
between sections 15(1) and (2). Section 15(2) explicitly exempts from
section 15(1) scrutiny any "law, program or activity" that seeks to
ameliorate the conditions of members of a disadvantaged group.
Affirmative action is appropriate, it was argued above, where signaling
costs are higher for a particular race. Signaling costs are predictably
higher as the result of historical disadvantage. Thus, justifying
affirmative action on the basis of historical disadvantage is consistent
with the economic analysis herein. Where there is historical
77 M.A. Drumbl & J.D.R. Craig, for example, view affirmative action under s. 15(2) as relating
not to substantive equality, but rather to a model of "social justice" designed to redress past wrongs
done to a group. See "Affirmative Action in Question: A Coherent Theory for Section 15(2)"
(1997) 4 Rev. Const. Stud. 80.
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disadvantage that affects signaling costs, the promotion of efficient,
substantive equality may require affirmative action programs.
This analysis provides an interpretation of how sections 15(1)
and 15(2) interrelate. Section 15(1) is designed to prevent the
emergence of distinct treatment of groups in the future even though
there is no inherent difference between the groups. Section 15(2)
recognizes, however, that where there has been historical disadvantage,
the promotion of equality in substantive matters may require affirmative
action programs. Section 15(1) promotes efficiency through equality
without regard to history; where historical differences between races
have been irrelevant to signaling costs, such an approach is appropriate.
Section 15(2), on the other hand, also looks to the past in determining
the optimal approach to future equality; if there have been historical
differences such that a race may face disadvantage in signaling,
affirmative action programs may be required to create future equality.
Colleen Sheppard offers a non-economic analysis of the
relationship between sections 15(1) and (2) that bears important
similarities to the interpretation invited by the economic analysis of this
article. She acknowledges that it is unlikely that courts will find that
historical disadvantage is required to bring a section 15(1) claim, but
does not treat this as precluding the view of section 15(2) as an
interpretive guide to section 15(1):
The possibility of advancing cogent arguments that the formal equality rights of socially
privileged groups have been violated [by an affirmative action programme] should not
preclude reaching the legal conclusion that equity initiatives are legally justifiable and
essential to the goal of substantive equality for individuals from socially disadvantaged
groups. It can be convincingly maintained, therefore, that statutory and constitutional
affirmative action provisions give clear direction to adjudicators that if the source of harm
to the historically advantaged individual is a special law or program designed to remedy
historical and social disadvantage, then it should not violate equality guarantees since
equality for socially disadvantaged groups should take precedence over the maintenance
of formal equality between individuals. 7 8
"Formal equality" in Sheppard's analysis can be interpreted in
the context of this article as equality with respect to signaling.
Moreover, the economic analysis advanced here sets out a view of how
an affirmative action program pursues substantive equality: the program
may be necessary to compensate for differences in signaling costs. Thus,
Sheppard's analysis resonates with the analysis herein: equality with
respect to the treatment of signals, formal equality, may be sacrificed in
pursuit of equality with respect to ability, substantive equality. Such
78 Sheppard, supra note 60 at 46.
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analysis does not preclude a finding that where historical disadvantage is
not relevant, it is a violation of section 15(1) to treat any group
unequally even if the inequality is formal, since differences in formal
treatment can give rise to substantive inequality in the future through
the emergence of separate signaling equilibria.
In a recent article, Mark Drumbl and John Craig take a different
position on the relationship between sections 15(1) and 15(2).79 They
conclude that section 15(2) sets out a defence to a section 15(1)
violation. They put significant weight on the following reasoning: given
that section 15(1) is itself addressed to substantive equality, section 15(2)
must be addressed to something other than substantive equality or it is
redundant; therefore, section 15(2) is not about substantive equality.8 0
In my view, such an analysis is problematic. The debate is whether
section 15(2) infonns the interpretation of section 15(1), which if true
indicates that while section 15(2) is not absolutely necessary to
establishing equality rights, it is important in determining the scope of
the equality rights set out in section 15(1). Under this view, section
15(2) admittedly does not set out any new rights, but it is not redundant.
Indeed, Drumbl and Craig's analysis of the meaning of
substantive equality under section 15(1) perhaps demonstrates the
importance of section 15(2) as an interpretive guide. They state:
Affirmative action only raises constitutional difficulties under section 15(1) (Le., is
"constitutionally problematic") where it allocates a social benefit to individuals on the
basis of their membership in a group, although group membership is irrelevant to the
issue of whether individuals want or need the benefit. All individuals, regardless of their
ethnic origin or gender, desire job training, employment, or contractual opportunities. A
governmental affirmative action program which grants social benefits to individuals
because of their ethnic origin or gender, and denies it to others on those same bases ....
risks being in conflict with s. 15(1) of the Charter, and must be assessed under the terms
of s. 15(2).
The economic analysis in this article, which admittedly is only one
approach that might lead to a different result from Drumbl and Craig's,
would suggest otherwise. Because historical disadvantage can lead to
differential signaling costs with respect to race, equal treatment with
respect to ability may imply treating races differently with respect to
signaling. A benefit may be denied to a member of a particular race and
create formal inequality, yet this may be consistent with pursuit of
substantive equality under section 15(1). Section 15(2), by emphasizing
the importance of historical disadvantage to substantive equality, invites
79 Drumbl & Craig, supra note 77.
80 Ibid. at 85.
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an interpretation of the scope of section 15(1) consistent with the
economic analysis discussed in this article. Different treatment with
respect to race may promote substantive equality and therefore be
consistent with section 15(1).
The analysis in this article perhaps also responds to a different
reason why Drumbl and Craig reject a view of section 15(2) as
interpretive guide. They conclude that the world is not divided neatly
into groups of "haves" and "have-nots." Members of a group may be
heterogeneous with respect to actual disadvantage; therefore affirmative
action favouring a group may not be consistent with substantive equality.
Consequently, they reason, section 15(2) is not about substantive
equality.
Sheppard responds to such an argument by stating that "[iut is
virtually impossible for an individual to escape all forms and vestiges of
discrimination directed at the social group(s) to which he or she
belongs." 8 1  Signaling analysis provides theoretical support for this
conclusion. If employers use race as a proxy for information, then
regardless of an individual's circumstances, her race will affect her future
prospects. Moreover, it was concluded above that culture is an
important determinant of education costs; thus, to the extent that race
affects culture, historically disadvantaged races may have higher costs of
education as a result of the culture to which they belong. The analysis
here does not suggest that individual circumstances will never vary, but it
does suggest that it is reasonable to conclude, as Sheppard does, that
virtually all members of a race will be affected by that race's historical
disadvantage if it exists.82
As a matter of precedent, there has been no definitive
proclamation by the Supreme Court of Canada on the relationship
between sections 15(1) and 15(2). In my view, however, there is
substantial jurisprudential support for the view of section 15(2) as an
interpretive guide offered here and elsewhere.83 For example, La Forest
J. stated in McKinney that "[t]he Charter itself by its authorization of
affirmative action under s. 15(2) recognized that legitimate measures for
81 Sheppard, supra note 60 at 24.
82 I will point out again that my analysis is directed at a constitutional framework.
Consequently, I make no claims about the appropriateness of specific affirmative action programs
for particular groups, but rather simply make the claim that the constitution should permit
affirmative action as a legitimate means of pursuing substantive equality.
83 See, for example, Sheppard, supra note 60; Canada Commission of Inquiry on Equality in
Employment, Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report (Toronto: The Commission,
1984); and W.S. Tarnopolsky, "The Equality Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 242.
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dealing with inequality might themselves create inequalities." 84 Mr.
Justice La Forest acknowledged that the purpose of affirmative action is
to deal with inequality; it is not an exception to a pursuit of equality.
There are other arguments based on legal principles that could also be
made in support of section 15(2) as an interpretive guide,85 but the
object of this article has been to show how economic efficiency relates to
antidiscrimination and affirmative action programs. Consequently, I will
restrict my attention to those discussions by the Supreme Court of
Canada which touch on the rationale behind affirmative action. In my
view, these assessments of the purpose of affirmative action are
consistent with the economic analysis in this article and its conclusion on
the relationship between subsections in section 15.
Athabasca Tribal Council v.Amoco Canada Petroleum Co. Ltd.86
involved a proposed plan by the Energy Resources Conservation Board
of Alberta to require affirmative action programs of parties seeking
approval of a tar sands plant. While the Supreme Court unanimously
agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to make such an order, a
minority of four commented on such a program's consistency with
legislative equality guarantees:
In the present case what is involved is a proposal designed to improve the lot of the native
peoples with a view to enabling them to compete as nearly as possible on equal terms
with other members of the community who are seeking employment in the tar sands
plant. With all respect, I can see no reason why the measures proposed by the
"affirmative action" programs for the betterment of the lot of native peoples in the area
in question should be construed as "discriminating against" other inhabitants. The
purpose of the plan as I understand it is not to displace non-Indians from their
employment, but rather to advance the lot of the Indians so that they may be in a
competitive position to obtain employment without regard to the handicaps which their
race has inherited.
8 7
This statement clearly supports the notion that affirmative action is not
an infringement of the equality rights of members of advantaged groups,
but rather seeks to protect the substantive equality rights of
disadvantaged groups. Affirmative action on this view would not need
justification as a violation of equality rights.
84 Supra note 54 at 318.
85 Consider a basic "statutory" interpretation argument. Section 15(2) states that s. 15(1) does
not preclude any law that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals. It does not provide that s. 15(1) does not apply to affirmative action, but rather
describes the scope of s. 15(1) by providing that s. 15(1) does not preclude affirmative action. On its
face, it appears that s. 15(2) simply informs analysis of s. 15(1).
86 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 699.
8 7 Ibid at 711, Ritchie J.
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The characterization of affirmative action by Ritchie J. which led
him to these conclusions is consistent with the economic analysis in this
article. The proposal was designed with a view to enabling native
peoples "to compete as nearly as possible on equal terms with other
members of the community ... without regard to the handicaps which
their race has inherited."88 This statement recognizes, as the analysis in
this article shows, that historical disadvantage may impede the ability of
certain groups to compete for jobs. Perhaps to compensate for
differential signaling costs and an adverse selection problem that might
have occurred, or to educate employers about the ability of Aboriginal
workers, affirmative action programs help Aboriginal workers to
compete on an equal basis for jobs. Consequently, such programs
promote substantive equality.
In upholding the imposition of an employment equity program
on the employer in Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian
Human Rights Commission),89 Chief Justice Dickson, on behalf of the
entire Court, provided reasoning that is quite consistent with an
economic analysis of substantive equality and affirmative action:
I have already stressed that systemic discrimination is often unintentional. It results from
the application of established practices and policies that, in effect, have a negative impact
upon the hiring and advancement prospects of a particular group. It is compounded by
the attitudes of managers and co-workers who accept stereotyped visions of the skills and
"proper role" of the affected group .... An employment equity program, such as the one
ordered by the Tribunal in the present case, is designed to break a continuing cycle of
systemic discrimination. The goal is not to compensate past victims or even to provide
new opportunities for specific individuals who have been unfairly refused jobs or
promotion in the past, although some such individuals may be beneficiaries of an
employment equity scheme. Rather, an employment equity program is an attempt to
ensure that future applicants and workers from the affected group will not face the same
insidious barriers that blocked their forebears.90
It is clear that this passage does not view employment equity
programs (which in the case at hand involved hiring a minimum of one
in four women employees until women constituted 13 per cent of the
total number of employees of the employer) as an exception to equality,
but rather as promoting equality. This is consistent with viewing section
15(2) as sharing the goals, and informing the interpretation, of section
15(1). Moreover, Dickson C.J.'s reasons for viewing affirmative action
as promoting substantive equality are entirely consistent with the
economic analysis of race discrimination in this article. "Stereotyping"
8 8 Ibid.
89 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114.
9 0 Ibid. at 1143.
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as mentioned by Dickson C.J. may be interpreted as the treatment of
race as a proxy for information, which was shown above to create the
possibility of an inefficient signaling equilibrium and an adverse
selection problem. As Dickson C.J. later stated, an employment equity
program implies that it will become "more and more difficult to ascribe
characteristics to an individual by reference to the stereotypical
characteristics ascribed to all women."9 1 This resonates with one
efficiency justification for affirmative action outlined above: it may act to
educate employers about the abilities of a particular group and the
relationship between that group's abilities and their signals.
Historical disadvantage is relevant under Dickson C.J.'s reasons,
as under the economic analysis herein, not because of a goal of
compensating for past discrimination, but rather as informing what is
required to ensure equality in the future. For example, if signaling costs
differ across races, higher signaling costs for a disadvantaged race may
act, to use Dickson C.J.'s wording, as "insidious barriers" to equal
employment. Affirmative action seeks to establish substantive equality
by removing those insidious barriers.9 2 As Dickson C.J. stated,
"[s]ystemic remedies must be built upon the experience of the past so as
to prevent discrimination in the future."9 3
Supreme Court jurisprudence on affirmative action programs,
while not resolving the question, supports the interpretation of section
15(2) as promoting the aims of section 15(1), not as exceptional to it.
Lower courts' decisions on the matter are mixed, but there are a
significant number of cases which favour the exception approach. 94 On
the other hand, Lovelace v. Ontario,9S a recent decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal, drawing upon the Supreme Court's expressions of its
views of equality canvassed above, takes an approach to section 15 that is
entirely consistent with the views expressed here. In a statement that
serves well as a summary of the preceding review of the matter in this
article, the court concludes:
We view s. 15(2) of the Charter as furthering the guarantee of equality in s. 15(1), not as
providing an exception to it. This view is grounded in our concept of equality and in the
91 IbiL at 1144.
9 2 Ibid. at 1143.
93 Ibid at 1145.
94 See, for example, Shewchuk v. Ricard (1986), 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 324 (C.A.); and Apsit v.
Manitoba (Human Rights Commission) (1987), 50 Man. R. (2d) 92 (Q.B.), rev'd on other grounds,
(1988), 55 Man. R. (2d) 263 (C.A.).
95 (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 735 (C.A.).
[VOL. 36 No. 2
Antidiscrimination and Economic Efficiency
Supreme Court of Canada's equality jurisprudence.... [T]he Supreme Court of Canada
has consistently stated that the purpose of the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) is to remedy
historical disadvantage, that identical treatment can perpetuate disadvantage and that
equality may sometimes require different treatment. Section 15(2) enhances this concept
of equality by recognizing that achieving equality may require positive action by
government to improve the conditions of historically socially disadvantaged individuals
and groups in Canadian society. We therefore read ss. 15(1) and 15(2) of the Charter
together to embrace this one consistent concept of equality. Treating s. 15(2) as an
exception or defence to s. 15(1) is antithetical to this concept.
96
The section 15 framework in Canada, in summary, is consistent with the
efficiency approach in this article.
2. United States
The American constitutional rule with respect to discrimination
is found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The "Equal
Protection Clause" states:
Nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
9 7
The clause only mentions state law, as opposed to federal law, but cases
have decided generally that the standards under the clause apply equally
to the federal government. 98 Due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment99 are violated by the federal government if it violates the
standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 In what follows, I will focus
on the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.
In order to compare and contrast the Canadian and American
approaches, I will consider the specific issues discussed already in the
Canadian context: Does discrimination need to be intentional, or is the
creation of a distinction on the basis of race sufficient to engage
Fourteenth Amendment concerns? Is historical disadvantage required?
And is affirmative action an exception to equality guarantees or
consistent with equality guarantees?
96 Ibid. at 752-53.
97 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 [hereinafter "Fourteenth Amendment"].
9 8 Boiling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497 (1954) [hereinafter Boiling].
99 U.S. Const. amend. V, which states, in part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law...."
100 See Boiling, supra note 98; and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
[hereinafter Adarand].
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With respect to the first question, it is apparent that where the
law makes explicit distinctions on the basis of race, equality concerns
under the Fourteenth Amendment arise; an intention to discriminate is
not required.101 A leading case on the question is Korematsu v. United
States.102 In that case, Black J., for the majority, stated:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of
a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions
are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
'Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can.103
Citing Korematsu, the Supreme Court held in subsequent cases that any
explicit legal distinction made on the basis of race was suspect and would
invite the "strict scrutiny" of the courts: the distinction is only
permissible if it is necessary for some legitimate public purpose 04
The rule in Korematsu obviously depends considerably on
interpretations of "public necessity." If "public necessity" is defined
broadly, such that effectively any public purpose other than an overtly
racist purpose satisfies the standard, then the Equal Protection Clause
may effectively establish a requirement of a discriminatory purpose. The
case law, however, has set a very high standard in establishing public
necessity. Indeed, the law in Korematsu itself, which involved the
101 To establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
case law does require a discriminatory purpose if the state action in question does not explicitly
create a distinction on the basis of race, but rather results in adverse effects for a particular racial
group: see Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (a qualifying test for the District of Columbia
police force which disproportionately excluded Black candidates did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment given the absence of a discriminatory purpose); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Corp. 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (a zoning decision which was alleged to result in adverse effects
for racial minorities did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment given the absence of discriminatory
purpose). This contrasts with the approach in Canada, which does not require a discriminatory
purpose whre there are adverse effects for groups on the basis of a prohibited ground of
discrimination: see, for example, Eldridge, supra note 74 (a provincial government health program
which failed to provide publicly funded interpratation services was unconstitutional as the result of
adverse effects on the hearing-impaired, regardless of discriminatory intent). Without discussing all
the implications of either approach, I will note that the Canadian rule may more efficiently account
for the fact that formally equal treatment may result in substantively different treatment where
there are differences across race in factors such as signling costs. The analysis would in some
respects be similar to that of affirmative action.
102 323 U.S. 214 (1944) [hereinafter Korematsu].
103 Ibid. at 216.
104 In Boiling, supra note 98 at 499, citing Korematsu, the Court stated: "Classification based
solely on race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and
hence consitutionally suspect." See also McLaughlin v. Florida 379 U.S. 483 (1964) at 191-92; and
Lovingv. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967) at 11.
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internment of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War, was
the only classification discriminating against minorities that has ever
been upheld under "strict scrutiny."105 As David Strauss says: "Ever
since Brown [v. Board of Education of TopekalO6], for measures
discriminating against minorities, strict scrutiny has been, in a familiar
phrase, "'strict" in theory, [but] fatal in fact."' 107
Thus, under American law, an explicit legal distinction on the
basis of race alone is effectively sufficient to raise equlaity concerns. As
discussed in the Canadian context, this is desirable according to the
analysis in this article. Regardless of bad faith, an explicit distinction on
the basis of race is enough to allow the creation of discriminatory,
inefficient signaling equilibria.
American case law is also clear that historical disadvantage,
whatever its relevance to affirmative action, is not required to bring an
equality claim under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Korematsu
and subsequent cases 0s held that any racial distinction would be subject
to strict scrutiny, regardless of the race in question and the degree of
historical disadvantage involved.
Again, American law and Canadian law both reach the same
conlusion, a conclusion which is desirable according to the economic
analysis in this article: historical disadvantage is not required to establish
an equality claim. Historical disadvantage should be relevant in
assessing an equality claim that involves affirmative action, but arbitrary,
distinct treatment of races could lead to discriminatory, inefficient
signaling equilibria regardless of historical disadvantage and thus should
be open to challenge by any race.
The United States Supreme Court's inclination to treat races
identically under the law regardless of disadvantage, however, may have
led the Court astray with respect to affirmative action, at least according
to the analysis in this article. Unlike the Canadian section 15(2), in the
United States, there is no constitutional provision directly addressing
affirmative action. Consequently, as Hogg states, "there is continuous
litigation over the constitutionality ... of affirmative action
105 D.A. Strauss, "Affirmative Action and the Public Interest" [1995] Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 at 9
[hereinafter "Strauss (1995)"].
106 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
107 "Strauss (1995)," supra note 105 at 9, citing G. Gunther, "The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal
Protection" (1972) 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 at 8.
108 See, for example, Bolling, supra note 98; McLaughlin, supra note 104; and Loving, supra
note 104.
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programmes."1 09 The following will briefly survey the most recent
leading cases on the constitutionality of affirmative action in the United
States Supreme Court_1 0 and will then assess the law according to the
signaling framework set out above.
In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,111 the Court, on the basis of a
strict scrutiny standard, invalidated the city of Richmond, Virginia's plan
for increasing the number of minority-owned businesses that were
awarded construction contracts. The majority held that correcting
"societal discrimination" was not a sufficiently compelling reason to
justify racial classifications and affirmative action.112 It held that if a
state or local government intends to use affirmative action as a remedial
tool, it must prove that the racial classification is narrowly tailored to
correct past discrimination by public or private actors within the
jurisdiction in question. Croson thus established a standard of strict
scrutiny for state and local governments, whereby affirmative action
measures must promote a compelling state interest and must be
necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission1 3 opened the door to a more lenient approach to
affirmative action, at least in the federal context. In that case, the Court
adopted an "intermediate scrutiny" standard with respect to federal
affirmative action programs. A five-member majority held that an
affirmative action race classification by Congress would be upheld as
long as the classification had a "substantial relationship" to a legitimate
Congressional interest. The dissenting justices disagreed that a different
standard should apply to the federal government with respect to
affirmative action than that applied in Croson to state and local
governments; this dissent foreshadowed Adarand.114
In Adarand, Metro Broadcasting was overruled. The majority
held that the standards with respect to affirmative action applying to
federal and state and local governments should be the same, following
the general principle that the Equal Protection Clause applies equally to
109 Hogg, supra note 56, c. 52 at 45, note 200.
110 For an extensive survey, see J.E. Nowak & R.D. Rotunda, Treatise on Constitutional Law:
Substance and Procedure, 2d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1992) § 18.10.
111 488 U.S. 469 (1989) [hereinafter Croson].
112 See ibid. at 498-507.
113 497 U.S. 547 (1990) [hereinafter Metro Broadcasting].
1 14 Supra note 100.
334 [VOL 36 No. 2
Antidiscrimination and Economic Efficiency
state and federal governments.llS Consequently, Adarand held that
strict scrutiny of affirmative action programs applied equally to the
federal government as well as to state and local governments.
Unfortunately, little guidance as to the meaning of strict scrutiny was
given inAdarand; the case was remanded, not finally decided.
The import of Adarand depends to a considerable extent on the
meaning of strict scrutiny with respect to affirmative action. As
discussed, outside the context of affirmative action, strict scrutiny has
come to mean "strict in theory, [but] fatal in fact;"116 racial
classifications virtually never survive strict scrutiny. Some commentators
have thus come to conclude that Adarand spells the end of affirmative
action in the United States.11 7 The cases themselves are clear, on the
other hand, in that they are not intended to outlaw affirmative action
outright. In Adarand, the majority stated, "[W]e wish to dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'11 8
While it is unclear to what extent affirmative action will be
permitted in the future, it is clear that the Court has restricted the
contexts in which it will be found constitutional. The economic analysis
in this article suggests that the Court has restricted it excessively. Rather
than taking an approach which would acknowledge that affirmative
action promotes substantive equality and therefore is not inconsistent
with equality guarantees, the United States Supreme Court has clearly
viewed affirmative action as presumptively inconsistent with equality.
For an affirmative action program to pass constitutional muster, the
onus is on the government to prove that it is a valid exception to
equality; specifically, that it corrects past inequalities created by the
specific government in question. This is inconsistent with the
economically sensible approach that I conclude is taken in Canada. I
have argued that section 15 recognizes that affirmative action pursues
substantive equality and therefore requires no justification as an
exception to equality guarantees.
The American situation demonstrates the potential inefficiencies
that may arise from a deeply skeptical approach to affirmative action.
The general problem is that, as discussed, recent case law and the "strict
115 See Boiling, supra note 98.
116 Gunther, supra note 107 at 8.
117 Consider the following titles of case notes: M.A. Sewell, "The Armageddon of Affirmative
Action" (1997) 46 DePaul L. Rev. 611; and the more restrained, but less colourful, E.C. Milby,
"Signaling the End of Affirmative Action" (1996) 6 Widener J. Pub. L 263.
118 Supra note 100 at 2117.
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scrutiny" doctrine may effectively end the possibility of federal
government affirmative action programs, which is undesirable from an
efficiency perspective. More specifically, viewing affirmative action as
inconsistent with equality has led to a restrictive approach to assessing
particular justificatory factors. For example, the Supreme Court
rejected reliance on "societal discrimination" as a basis for affirmative
action.1 19 Rather, the discrimination to be remedied must be either
caused by the government in question, or within the jurisdiction in
question. The signaling approach would not draw such a distinction. If
a group is disadvantaged with respect to signaling costs, whether such
disadvantage resulted from general societal discrimination or particular
discrimination, equal treatment with respect to signaling may lead to
unequal treatment with respect to ability. Affirmative action programs
may efficiently account for disparate signaling costs and indeed may help
reduce the disparity in an efficient manner. The American skepticism of
such policy, which has clearly manifested itself in recent cases, may
reduce the potential for efficiency-enhancing government action either
as employer or as legislator.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the above economic analysis supports the
Canadian approach. In order to hasten the exit from the market of
bigoted employers and to prevent differences in the treatment of
different races, which may in turn lead to the underutilization of high-
ability members of particular races, the government is clearly permitted
to pass antidiscrimination legislation. Moreover, given that it is
insulated from market forces, legislation is needed to prevent the
government from discriminating as an employer. However, in order to
account for the presence of differential signaling costs, and to reduce the
difference in signaling costs between races, affirmative action is
recognized as consistent with substantive equality. The above analysis
does not imply that affirmative action is always efficient in the face of
disadvantage; particular circumstances must be analyzed before such a
view could be supported. This analysis has shown that affirmative action
programs may be efficient in a range of circumstances, which in turn
supports the view that constitutional law should empower the
government to permit preferential treatment of particular races and
indeed compel such treatment in some circumstances. To the extent
119 See Croson, supra note 111 at 505-507.
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that an interpretation of the American Constitution forbids governments
to encourage or practice affirmative action, it may lead to inefficiencies.
An efficiency analysis supports the Canadian approach.

